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Abstract
In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about un-
certain aggregate outcomes such as policy choices can be detrimental to social welfare.
By announcing informative signals on non-insurable aggregate risk, the policy maker
distorts agents’ insurance incentives and increases the riskiness of the optimal alloca-
tion that is feasible in self-enforceable arrangements. As an application, we consider a
monetary authority that may reveal changes in the inﬂation target, and document that
the negative eﬀect of distorted insurance incentives can very well dominate conventional
eﬀects in favor for the release of better information.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81, D86, E21, E52, E65.
Keywords: Social value of information, policy announcements, monetary policy, trans-
parency.
1 Non-technical summary
Nowadays central banks all over the world provide more information and release it earlier to
the public than ever before in their history (Blinder et al., 2008, Crowe and Meade, 2008,
Eijﬃnger and Geraats, 2006, Woodford, 2008). Moreover, there seems to be widespread
agreement that these recent changes in disclosure policies are socially beneﬁcial. We argue
that the case for disclosure is not that obvious. The main message of the paper is that in the
presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about uncertain aggregate
outcomes such as policy choices can be detrimental to social welfare.
The argument is based on the importance of rational incentives for designing socially
optimal insurance arrangements. When participation incentives matter, then the amount
of the consumption good that agents with high income in the current period are willing
to transfer reﬂects future beneﬁts of the insurance relative to the outside option. This
relative future value of the arrangement depends not only on their idiosyncratic realization
but also on the signal about the aggregate state. The larger the relative gains of the risk-
sharing arrangement in the aggregate state that the signal indicates, the more willing is the
high income agent to share his good fortune today. As the signal on the aggregate state
becomes more informative, the optimal consumption allocation spreads out to account for
all possible realizations of the signal. For high income agents, the expected utility before the
signal materializes is the same under informative and uninformative signals. This in turn
implies that the consumption allocation of high income agents under perfect information is
riskier than under imperfect information. Since households are risk averse, under perfect
information high income agents are less willing to transfer goods to low income households.
Correspondingly, under imperfect information low income households are better oﬀ, and
from an ex-ante perspective agents prefer uninformative policy announcements.
As our main application, we develop a stochastic equilibrium model that integrates the
risk-sharing mechanism into a monetary production economy in which households are subject
to cash-in-advance constraints and face idiosyncratic employment opportunities. To insureNon-technical summary
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against the idiosyncratic risk, households may engage in risk-sharing arrangements consistent
with voluntary participation incentives. The monetary authority is assumed to pursue a
stochastic inﬂation target. The target is known to the monetary authority one period in
advance, and the authority may choose to release that information with certain precision.
Our novel ﬁnding in this environment is that more precise announcements on future monetary
policy are detrimental to social welfare. Furthermore, we show that the level of patience
needed to sustain perfect risk sharing as the ﬁrst best allocation is strictly increasing in the
precision of the monetary policy announcement.
To evaluate the detrimental eﬀect of policy announcements, we extend the model by
introducing a fraction of ﬁrms, which need to set prices one period in advance. With this
extension, better information aﬀects the economy in two ways. First and conventionally,
more precise announcements allow the sticky price ﬁrms to preset their prices more accu-
rately, thereby resulting in less price distortions and a better allocation of resources. Second
– and this is the new eﬀect – early announcements distort risk sharing, increase consumption
inequality and thereby worsen the contractual insurance possibilities ex-ante. We calibrate
the monetary production economy to match basic inﬂation and income characteristics of
the U.S. economy on an annual basis. The negative eﬀect of information on aggregate risk
is sizeable: the cost of information disclosure accounts for 18 percent of the beneﬁt from
removing aggregate ﬂuctuations all together. Employing recent evidence on the frequency of
price adjustments (Bils and Klenow, 2004), the negative eﬀect of information quantitatively
dominates the positive aspect for reasonable degrees of risk aversion. Furthermore, the re-
cent increase in income inequality in the U.S. (Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 2002, Krueger and
Perri, 2006) ampliﬁes the negative rather than the positive eﬀect of public information.
2 Introduction
Nowadays central banks all over the world provide more information and release it earlier to
the public than ever before in their history (Blinder et al., 2008, Crowe and Meade, 2008,
Eijﬃnger and Geraats, 2006, Woodford, 2008). There seems to be widespread agreement that
these recent changes in disclosure policies are socially beneﬁcial. We argue that the case for
disclosure is not that obvious. In particular, we show that by providing better information
on future aggregate risk, e.g. by announcing future policies or revealing economic forecasts,
policy makers may decrease social welfare by distorting private insurance incentives.
We consider an environment with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. Households can vol-
untarily participate in insurance arrangements to reduce their consumption risk. Such ar-
rangements are self-enforceable or compatible with voluntary participation incentives if in
any period following the realization of idiosyncratic uncertainty, households choose not to
walk away from the arrangement, and live in autarky from that period on. The latter option
may be tempting for households with a high current income since the insurance arrange-
ments prescribe transfers from these households to households with a low income in the
current period. The lack of commitment thus creates a tension for high income households
between higher current consumption and the future beneﬁts of insurance promised in the
arrangements.
Information plays a crucial role in households’ trade-oﬀ between future insurance and
current incentives. We study disclosure polices by introducing a public signal through which
the future aggregate state is revealed. The signal is common to all agents and does not resolve
households’ idiosyncratic uncertainty. After the realization of current period idiosyncratic
income and given the public signal on future aggregate risks agents decide to participate in
social insurance.
As our main result, we formally show that less precise public information about the
future aggregate state is preferable over perfect public information when incentive constraints
matter. The mechanism is the following. Under the socially optimal insurance arrangement,Introduction
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the amount of the consumption good that the agents with high income in the current period
are willing to transfer reﬂects future beneﬁts of the insurance relative to the outside option.
The key point is that agents value the insurance arrangement conditionally not only on their
idiosyncratic realization but also on the signal about the aggregate state. In particular, if
the signal indicates that the future aggregate state is likely to be one in which the beneﬁts of
the arrangement are relatively large, then the agents are willing to give up a larger share of
current period consumption goods for these future beneﬁts of the arrangement. Similarly, if
the signal informs of a future aggregate state in which the gains of the risk-sharing agreement
are relatively low, then agents with a high current income are less willing to share their good
fortune. When the signal on the aggregate state becomes more informative, the optimal
consumption allocation spreads out to account for all possible realizations of the signal. For
high income agents, the expected utility before the signal materializes is the same under
informative and uninformative signals. This implies that the consumption allocation of high
income agents under perfect information is riskier than under imperfect information. Since
households are risk averse, under perfect information high income agents are less willing to
transfer goods to low income households. Correspondingly, under imperfect information low
income households are better oﬀ, and from an ex-ante perspective agents prefer uninformative
policy announcements.
Unlike Hirshleifer (1971) and his successors (Berk and Uhlig, 1993, Schlee, 2001), we focus
on the welfare eﬀects of more precise signals on aggregate, not on idiosyncratic risk. This
diﬀerence is substantial: there are aggregate states in which more precise signals actually
lead to better risk sharing, which cannot happen in case of signals on idiosyncratic risk. In
these states, the value of the arrangement relative to the outside option is high, and thus
better informed high income agents are willing to share more. Like in Hirshleifer, the overall
eﬀect of information is negative but relies here on the relevance of voluntary participation
incentives for risk sharing. If agents were to respect commitments or trade a complete set of
perfectly enforceable insurance contracts, better public information on aggregate risk would
not aﬀect social welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to shed light on the welfare eﬀects of
announcements on risks that are common to all agents under the plausible assumption that
the idiosyncratic risk is not completely, but only partially insurable.
As our main application, we develop a stochastic equilibrium model that integrates the
risk-sharing mechanism into a monetary production economy in which households are subject
to cash-in-advance constraints and face idiosyncratic employment opportunities. To insure
against the idiosyncratic risk, households may engage in risk-sharing arrangements consistent
with voluntary participation incentives. The monetary authority is assumed to pursue a
stochastic inﬂation target. The target is known to the monetary authority one period in
advance, and the authority may choose to release that information with certain precision.
Our novel ﬁnding in this environment is that more precise announcements on future monetary
policy are detrimental to social welfare. Furthermore, we show that the level of patience
needed to sustain perfect risk sharing as the ﬁrst best allocation is strictly increasing in the
precision of the monetary policy announcement.
To evaluate the detrimental eﬀect of policy announcements, we extend the model by
introducing a fraction of ﬁrms, which need to set prices one period in advance. With this
extension, better information aﬀects the economy in two ways. First and conventionally,
more precise announcements allow the sticky price ﬁrms to preset their prices more accu-
rately, thereby resulting in less price distortions and a better allocation of resources. Second
– and this is the new eﬀect – early announcements distort risk sharing, increase consumption
inequality and thereby worsen the contractual insurance possibilities ex-ante. We calibrate
the monetary production economy to match basic inﬂation and income characteristics of
the U.S. economy on an annual basis. The negative eﬀect of information on aggregate risk
is sizeable: the cost of information disclosure accounts for 18 percent of the beneﬁt from
removing aggregate ﬂuctuations all together. Employing recent evidence on the frequency of
price adjustments (Bils and Klenow, 2004), the negative eﬀect of information quantitatively
dominates the positive aspect for reasonable degrees of risk aversion. Furthermore, the re-
cent increase in income inequality in the U.S. (Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 2002, Krueger andIntroduction
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Perri, 2006) ampliﬁes the negative rather than the positive eﬀect of public information.
The social value of information has been extensively studied in the literature. Our paper
builds a bridge between two distinct strands of literature: the literature on global games
that focuses on aggregate risk, and the literature on eﬃcient risk sharing that concentrates
on the insurance of idiosyncratic risk. The model we develop puts us into the position to
analyze the welfare eﬀects of more precise information on the aggregate state of the economy
under the realistic assumption that the idiosyncratic risk is not fully diversiﬁable. Moreover,
the analysis of the welfare eﬀects of better information on aggregate risk involves technical
challenges that are absent in frameworks that focus on idiosyncratic risk.
In a global games framework, Morris and Shin (2002) show that better public information
on aggregate risks may be undesirable in the presence of private information on these risks
when the coordination of agents is driven by strategic complementarities in their actions. The
result is due to the ineﬃciently high weight that agents assign to public information relative
to private information. While the conditions for a welfare-decreasing eﬀect of more precise
public information are rather special and controversial (see e.g. Svensson, 2006, Woodford,
2005), Angeletos and Pavan (2007) draw a general conclusion that in the presence of a signal-
extraction problem the social value of information is ambiguous if the ﬁrst best is diﬀerent
from the equilibrium under perfect information. The main focus in this ﬁeld is on aggregate
risk, while idiosyncratic risk is either absent or assumed to be completely insurable due to
the existence of complete ﬁnancial markets.
Our study is closely related to the literature on eﬃcient risk sharing. Hirshleifer (1971)
is among the ﬁrst to point out that perfect information makes risk averse agents ex-ante
worse oﬀ if this leads to evaporation of risks that otherwise could have been shared in a
competitive equilibrium. Schlee (2001) shows under which general conditions better public
information about idiosyncratic risk is undesirable.
Kocherlakota (1996a) shows that the lack of commitment can explain the empirically
observed positive correlation between current income and current consumption. The prop-
erties of stationary contracts in comparison to the ﬁrst best are characterized by Coate and
Ravallion (1993). Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and Krueger and Perri (2005) argue that
in economies where agreements are not enforceable, public insurance may crowd out private
insurance arrangements. This literature focuses on the role of information on idiosyncratic
risk in eﬃcient risk-sharing arrangements. More relevant and important from a practical
perspective, we consider the role of information on aggregate risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we start with a
simple two-period example to highlight the basic voluntary risk-sharing mechanism involved,
and state our main result in that simple environment. In Section 4 we set up a model that
integrates the mechanism into a monetary production economy with inﬁnite horizon and
ﬂexible prices. In Section 5 we state the main results for that application. In Section 6
we evaluate the importance of the distortions of risk-sharing possibilities caused by policy
announcements. The last section concludes.
3 Simpliﬁed two-period real economy
We set up a simple example that captures the interaction between individual incentives
for sharing idiosyncratic risk and the precision of public signals on aggregate risk. When
participation in a risk-sharing arrangement is voluntary we show that risk averse agents prefer
completely uninformative public signals on the aggregate risk over perfectly informative
signals.
Consider a two period pure exchange economy with a continuum of ex-ante identical
agents. In each period an agent obtains either a high endowment yh or a low endowment yl
with equal probability – independent across time and agents. Furthermore, in the second
period households’ income is aﬀected by taxes.1 To ease the exposition, we assume that with
equal probability the government can either tax away all goods (type-b policy) or impose zero
tax (type-g policy), and assume that tax revenues are completely wasted by the government.
1The tax is a convenient and general way to introduce aggregate risks associated with government policies.
It also includes the inﬂation tax we consider in the next section.Simplified two-period real economy
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The preferences of agents are given by
E[u(c1) + βu(c2)], (1)
where c1 and c2 are consumption in the ﬁrst and in the second period respectively, β is
the discount factor, and the period utility function u(c) is increasing and strictly concave.
We measure social welfare according to (1), i.e. as households’ expected utility before any
uncertainty has been resolved.2
If agents are able to commit before their endowments realize in the ﬁrst period, the
optimal risk-sharing arrangement is perfect risk sharing. The commitment requirement is
crucial. After observing current endowments an agent with a high income may have an
incentive to deviate from the perfect risk-sharing agreement, making such an agreement
unsustainable.
To capture this rational incentive we analyze risk-sharing possibilities under two-sided
lack of commitment by introducing voluntary participation constraints. In the two-period
model, the voluntary participation constraints apply only for the ﬁrst period and characterize
the trade-oﬀ between the ﬁrst period consumption and the value of risk sharing provided by
the arrangement in the second period. A risk-sharing arrangement is sustainable if each agent
after observing his ﬁrst period endowment at least weakly prefers to follow the arrangement
than to defect into autarky. In other words, it is in the best rational interest of each
agent to support the agreement. For the second period we assume that agents respect the
commitments made in the ﬁrst period. Otherwise, if voluntary participation were allowed in
both periods, there would be no room for social insurance as agents would always choose to
consume their endowments. While commitment for the second period is necessary for the
existence of insurance in the two-period model, we do not need to impose any commitment
in the inﬁnite horizon model provided in the next section.
2We consider equal Pareto weights across ex-ante identical agents. If we were to allow for non-equal Pareto
weights social welfare would still be higher under imperfect information than under perfect information about
aggregate risk.
We compare two environments diﬀerent in information precision about the future gov-
ernment policy. In the environment of perfect information agents know the second period
government policy when in the ﬁrst period they decide to sustain the risk-sharing agreement
or to deviate to autarky. In the environment of completely imperfect information agents are
left uninformed about the government policy.
In the ﬁrst environment, when future government policy is known, participation con-

























1b) + βu(0) ≥ u(y

























1b) + βu(0) ≥ u(y
l) + βu(0), (5)
where ci
1k is period-1 consumption of an agent with yi ﬁrst period endowment under type-k
government policy, and c
ij
2k is period-2 consumption of an agent with yi endowment in the ﬁrst
period and yj endowment in the second period. In the constraints we explicitly substituted
c
ij
2b = 0 for type-b policy. The ﬁrst two constraints are relevant for agents with high ﬁrst
period income and the latter describe the incentives of agents with low ﬁrst period income.
The left hand side of each constraint constitutes expected utility of the arrangement, and
the right hand side is the value of living in autarky as the outside option.














































2k} that maximizes ex-ante utility (1) subject to participation
constraints (2)-(5) and resource constraints (6).Simplified two-period real economy
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The second environment is set to represent completely imperfect information. In the ﬁrst
period after observing their current endowments – without knowing the government policy
in the second period – agents decide about participation in the risk-sharing agreement.



















































































2k} that maximizes ex-ante utility (1) subject to participation con-
straints (7)-(8) and resource constraints (9).
Our goal is to highlight that information about aggregate risk can be harmful for social
welfare since it distorts the insurance of idiosyncratic risk under voluntary participation.
The result is formally stated in Theorem 1. The intuition is the following. From an ex-
ante perspective, the agents desire to share their idiosyncratic endowment risk. The optimal
insurance scheme prescribes transfers from high income agents to low income agents in all
states. While agents with a low income are never worth-oﬀ in the agreement, for agents
with a high income to live alternatively in autarky may be an attractive outside option. The
better informed high income agents are about the future tax policy the less willing they are
to transfer resources to the less fortunate agents.
Theorem 1 Under completely imperfect information social welfare is strictly higher than
under perfect information about future government policies.
Proof. One can distinguish three cases depending on which participation constraints are
binding. In the ﬁrst case, all participation constraints for high endowment agents under
perfect and imperfect information are binding. In the second case, only the participation
constraints for high income agents under type-b policy are binding. In the third case, which
is an intermediate case between the ﬁrst two, for high income agents the participation con-
straints under type-b policy and imperfect information are binding.
In the ﬁrst case, it follows from the optimal risk-sharing problem that consumption of
the agents under type-g policy should be perfectly smoothed over time for both information
















The algebraic details for this result are provided in the technical appendix. Under type-b
policy, agents consume nothing in the second period, and we immediately obtain that in
the perfect information environment ch
1b = yh and cl
1b = yl. We thus compare the informa-
tion environments in terms of the ﬁrst period allocations. From the binding participation
constraints (2), (3), and (7) it follows that the ﬁrst period allocations under the two infor-




are further illustrated in Figure 1.
From the binding participation constraints (2), (3), and (7) it also follows that agents with
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Figure 1: Optimal allocations for perfect and imperfect information under binding partici-
pation constraints.
























For the expected utility of agents with a low income in the ﬁrst period under perfect and












































































where the ﬁrst inequality is due to strict concavity and the second one is implied by (11).
Thus, agents with low ﬁrst period endowments are strictly better oﬀ under completely im-
perfect information. Taking unconditional expectation, adding up (10) and (12) we get that
imperfect information is strictly preferable for this case.
In the second case when the participation constraints in the environment of imperfect
information are not binding, the optimal allocation in this environment is perfect risk sharing.
This outcome is preferable to the one under perfect information where the ﬁrst best is not
incentive compatible because the participation constraints for type-b policy (3) and (5) always
hold with equality.
In the third case when the participation constraints for high ﬁrst period endowment agents
under type-g policy (2) are not binding but the participation constraints for high income
agents in the completely uninformative environment (7) do bind, imperfect information is
still preferable. It can be seen that as agents become more patient the ﬁrst period allocation
for perfect information cannot be improved upon, but under imperfect information social
welfare is still increasing towards the ﬁrst best.
Compared to the literature on eﬃcient risk sharing and public information (e.g. Berk and
Uhlig, 1993, Hirshleifer, 1971, Schlee, 2001), we show that not only public information on
idiosyncratic risk but also on non-insurable aggregate risk can be harmful to social welfare.
Unlike in that literature, there are aggregate states, in which perfectly informative signals
improve risk sharing. This occurs when the government reveals type-g policy. Since the
expected utility of the arrangement is high relative to the outside option, high income agents
in this state are willing to share more with low income agents (see Figure 1).
The result of the negative social value of public information about the second period
government policy is robust to any policies which lead to a non-identical dispersion of agents’
disposable income. For example, if the tax were lump sum or if the government were to
redistribute the tax revenues equally among agents, better information on the taxes would
be still undesirable. Moreover, it is not crucial for the ﬁnding in Theorem 1 to require a
policy under which the idiosyncratic risk vanishes completely. Even if taxation were not as
extreme as a 100% tax, the result on the negative value of information stays valid.
Morris and Shin (2002) too provide an argument for a negative value of better infor-
mation on aggregate risk in the presence of a signal-extraction problem. However, theirSimplified two-period real economy
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argument has been criticized from a normative perspective (Woodford, 2005). Woodford’s
main criticism is that the strong coordination incentive necessary to render the value of public
information negative is at odds with the type of preferences typically assumed in macroe-
conomic modeling. Moreover, he points out that the Morris-Shin result hinges crucially on
the assumption that individual preferences, but not social welfare feature the coordination
motive. In contrast, we show that the social value of information can be negative even under
standard preferences and even when individual preferences and social welfare coincide.
There are numerous possible applications including the welfare assessment of announce-
ments on future tax, spending, debt or monetary policies, as well as the welfare eﬀects of
the public disclosure of economic forecasts. Because of its value for many economic deci-
sions, even the general public pays special attention to information revealed by monetary
authorities. Announcements by ﬁscal authorities on the other hand are less surprising since
in developed countries ﬁscal decisions are mainly adopted through prolonged parliamentary
mechanisms.
In the next section we therefore embed the risk-sharing mechanism into a richer environ-
ment with a monetary authority which announces a signal on its future inﬂation target. In
that application we extend the simple example in several dimensions. First, we do not im-
pose any commitment and consider an economy with an inﬁnite number of periods. Second,
we allow for continuity in information precision.
4 Monetary policy and inﬁnite horizon
We proceed by integrating the voluntary risk-sharing mechanism into a monetary production
economy. In this section we introduce an economy and describe the notion of equilibrium. In
the economy, households’ consumption expenditures are linked to nominal balances from the
previous period with a cash-in-advance constraint originated by Clower (1967). As in Lucas
(1980), each household consists of a worker-shopper pair. The production part comprises two
sectors. Each sector is populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms (Blan-
chard and Kiyotaki, 1987, Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Sectors diﬀer in the productivity of the
monopolistic ﬁrms. The random assignment of workers to ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity
constitutes idiosyncratic risk. The notion of equilibrium is introduced in two steps. First,
we deﬁne an equilibrium for given risk-sharing transfers among households. Second – and
this is our main contribution here – we introduce the possibility for households to insure
the idiosyncratic risk in arrangements that are consistent with their rational participation
incentives (Kocherlakota, 1996a). The exchange of consumption goods prescribed by the ar-
rangements is reﬂected in risk-sharing transfers among households. Furthermore, we deﬁne
the optimal pure insurance transfers under voluntary participation in order to ﬁnd out how
informative signals on future inﬂation aﬀect the optimal insurance.
We consider an inﬁnite-period production economy with a continuum of households of
measure one and a single perishable consumption good.













t is consumption of household i in period t, 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor,
and u(c) is the period utility function. We assume the period utility function to be twice-
diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
Each household consists of two members: a shopper and a worker. Each period, the
worker earns idiosyncratic income and inelastically supplies one unit of labor to one of
the two production sectors, while the shopper buys consumption goods. Money is the only
means for facilitating transactions and transferring wealth across periods. The period budget
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proﬁts of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, τi
t are real transfers prescribed by a risk-sharing
arrangement, w
f
t is the real wage in production sector f where the worker is employed, and
pt is the aggregate price level.
A shopper and a worker are distinguished by activities. In each period, while a worker
works and earns money, a shopper exchanges the money earned by the worker in the previous









t is the amount of the consumption good directly bought in the market.3
The production part of the economy is represented by two production sectors. Both
sectors include a ﬁnal good ﬁrm and a continuum of intermediate good ﬁrms. In each period
the ﬁnal good ﬁrms in both sectors produce an identical consumption good by aggregating
over sector-speciﬁc diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The intermediate goods are aggregated
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for all intermediate good ﬁrms within a production sector, but diﬀerent across the sectors.
3Alternatively, the cash-in-advance constraints can be stated with inequalities. However, allowing for
inequalities and therefore for self-insurance does not aﬀect our main results. In Section 6, we conduct the
latter exercise as a robustness check.
Acting under perfect competition, ﬁnal good ﬁrms minimize costs by choosing the factor









subject to the technology constraint (16), where p
fj
t is the price of the intermediate good j
that the ﬁnal good ﬁrm in sector f takes as given.
The intermediate good producers operate under monopolistic competition. A measure
λ of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms maximize proﬁts subject to the actual demand for
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given the demand of the ﬁnal good ﬁrm and nominal sector wages, and subject to the
production technology (17). The other (1 − λ) ﬁrms preset prices a period ahead based on










where st−1 is the signal released in period t − 1 about inﬂation target in period t.
In each period, a worker is randomly assigned either to be employed in the sector of
high productivity ah, or to work for ﬁrms with low productivity al. After selling the ﬁnal
goods to the shoppers, a worker obtains labor income and an equal share of proﬁts of all
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms.
Monetary policy is characterized by a stochastic inﬂation target. All agents in the econ-
omy are rational and know the stochastic properties of the inﬂation target process. In
addition, the monetary authority knows the inﬂation target one period in advance, and pro-
vides a public signal on the future inﬂation target with a certain precision. The exogenous
process for the gross inﬂation target πj is given by an i.i.d process with two states of equalMonetary policy and infinite horizon
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probability: high inﬂation πh and low inﬂation πl.4 Similarly, the public signal on the next
period inﬂation target takes two values, a high realization sh and a low realization sl. The
precision of the public signal is given by κ ≡ Prob[πj|sj], with 1/2 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
The actual inﬂation coincides with the inﬂation target by appropriate money injections
in all states. Since seigniorage is spent on government expenditures,5 the government budget
constraint reads
ptgt = Mt − Mt−1, (21)
where gt denotes real government expenditures, and Mt is the aggregate money supply.














t } such that given exogenous processes for the inﬂation target
{πt}, the public signal {st}, the assignments of households to production sectors {ai
t}, and
the risk-sharing transfers {τi
t}, and initial conditions for the distribution of nominal money
balances {Mi
−1}, and initial price setting of non-ﬂexible price ﬁrms {p
fj
0 }, the following
conditions hold
(i) for each household i given prices {pt,w
f
t } and proﬁts {d
f




maximizes household’s utility (13) subject to the budget constraint (14) and the cash-
in-advance constraint (15),
(ii) for each production sector f given prices {pt,w
f







t } and proﬁts {d
f
t} solve the cost minimization problem of the ﬁnal good ﬁrms
(18), and the proﬁt maximization problems of the diﬀerentiated good ﬁrms (19) and
(20),
(iii) monetary injections are consistent with the inﬂation target
pt = πtpt−1,
4The inﬂation target process and productivity are assumed to be non-degenerate πl < πh and al < ah.
5Alternatively, when seigniorage is equally distributed back to households our main results stated in
Theorem 2 stay valid.





















We assume that the low realization of the inﬂation target is large enough to satisfy
the resource feasibility with non-negative government expenditures. When we refer to social
welfare derived from a certain allocation, we mean the ex-ante utility (13), which is evaluated
before any uncertainty has been resolved.
The main element of our model is households’ risk-sharing arrangement under voluntary
participation. Without risk-sharing transfers the consumption allocation that results from
the incomplete markets equilibrium is not eﬃcient from an ex-ante perspective due to market
incompleteness which prevents households from optimal borrowing and lending. However,
the eﬃcient use of a complete set of securities requires commitment or enforceability of the ar-
rangements. In the absence of commitment the consumption allocation can still be improved
by risk-sharing transfers consistent with voluntary participation incentives. We determine
the socially optimal transfer scheme under voluntary participation in the incomplete markets
equilibrium. Voluntary participation in social insurance provided by the risk-sharing trans-
fers means that in each period households may decline the oﬀered risk-sharing arrangement.
In such a case they live forever in an economy with no transfers, consuming only the goods
bought directly in the market.
With this mechanism we seek to capture ﬁnancial market imperfections in an abstract
way – either incompleteness of the ﬁnancial markets themselves or private agents’ limited
access to it. When participation incentives matter, the resulting equilibrium consumption
allocations share key properties with individual consumption patterns in the data (Krueger
and Perri, 2006). In particular, lack of commitment results in a positive correlation between
current income and current consumption – a stylized fact that cannot be explained in modelsMonetary policy and infinite horizon
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with complete ﬁnancial markets (Kocherlakota, 1996a).
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Figure 2: Timing of events in the monetary production economy.
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 2. In each period, ﬁrst, agents obtain a
public signal on next period’s inﬂation target and observe the current period inﬂation target.6
Second, households decide on sustaining a risk-sharing arrangement that prescribes transfers
{τi
t}. Third, workers and shoppers separate, and the former inelastically supply their labor
services into the production process. Fourth, market exchange takes place. Flexible price
monopolistic ﬁrms set prices for the current period, shoppers receive consumption goods in
exchange for cash held from the previous period, workers receive wages and shares of proﬁts
and the government collects seigniorage from money injections. Fifth, among shoppers an
exchange according to the risk-sharing arrangement takes place. Finally, members of each
household meet again, consume, money balances are passed from the worker to the shopper
for next period consumption purchases, and sticky price ﬁrms preset prices for the next
period based on the public signal on the future inﬂation target.
Formally, the risk-sharing arrangement is built upon the consumption allocation of the in-
complete markets equilibrium with no transfers as the outside option. This “oﬀ-equilibrium”
allocation coincides with the equilibrium amount of consumption goods directly bought in
the market {xi
t} since there is no choice how much money the agents hold from this period
to next, and therefore how much they purchase. Moreover, since the equilibrium on the
goods’ market is not linked to the distribution of consumption among households, prices in
the equilibrium without and with transfers are identical.
6An alternative timing of events that leads to exactly the same results and does not require the awareness
of current period inﬂation includes shoppers’ trading ﬁrst, followed by the risk sharing decision, and workers’
realization of income.
Let the individual public state at time t be hi
t = (xi
t,Xt,st), where st is the public
signal about inﬂation in period t + 1, and Xt denotes aggregate resources available for
private consumption. We restrict our analysis to pure insurance arrangements as emphasized
by Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), and Ligon et al. (2002), which implies
that the current risk-sharing transfers do not depend on transfers received in the past.
Models that allow for history-dependent arrangements tend to overpredict the extent of risk
sharing in practice (Alvarez and Jermann, 2001, Krueger et al., 2008). Tractability is an
additional beneﬁt. With pure insurance transfers we can analytically characterize the eﬀect
of information on social welfare.
Deﬁnition 2 A consumption allocation {ci
t} is sustainable if there exist transfers {τi
t} such
that
(i) the consumption allocation {ci




(ii) for each household i and state hi
t, the consumption allocation {ci
t} is weakly preferable
































t)di = 0. (23)
The key element of the information set in period t is the public signal on inﬂation provided
by the monetary authority. The signal helps to resolve inﬂation uncertainty for the agents.Monetary policy and infinite horizon
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The key element of the information set in period t is the public signal on inﬂation provided
by the monetary authority. The signal helps to resolve inﬂation uncertainty for the agents.Negative social value of information
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Deﬁnition 3 A socially optimal arrangement under voluntary participation is a consump-
tion allocation {ci
t} that provides the highest expected utility among the set of sustainable
allocations.
It is natural to compare the optimal arrangement under voluntary participation to an
optimal arrangement under commitment. We deﬁne the optimal commitment allocation
as a consumption allocation that provides the highest expected utility among the set of
consumption-feasible allocations. An allocation is consumption-feasible if it solves the in-
complete markets equilibrium with resource-feasible transfers {τi
t}.
5 Negative social value of information
In this section we deliver our main result that policy announcements about future mone-
tary policy can be detrimental to social welfare. We show that better precision of policy
announcements is not desirable because it harms individual risk-sharing possibilities when
rational participation incentives matter. In addition, we show that under more informa-
tive signals perfect risk sharing requires a higher degree of patience to be supported as a
sustainable allocation.
To highlight the main eﬀect we abstain in this section from the eﬀect of public signals on
optimal pricing decisions of ﬁrms. We avoid the pricing friction on the ﬁrm side by assuming
in this section that all intermediate ﬁrms are ﬂexible price ﬁrms. In the next section we
extend the main result by illustrating a trade-oﬀ in public signal precision when a fraction
of ﬁrms has to preset prices one period in advance: more precise information reduces the
dispersion in relative prices between ﬂexible and sticky-price ﬁrms and thereby leads to a
better allocation of resources.
5.1 Optimal risk sharing under voluntary participation
In the following paragraphs we characterize the incomplete markets equilibrium under ﬂexible
prices, then proceed to state the problem to design the socially optimal arrangement in
recursive form and derive general properties of the optimal solution.
As an initial point of our analysis we compute the incomplete markets equilibrium in
the absence of transfers. Due to constant labor supply and since all ﬁrms are ﬂexible in
their price setting, the income of household i earned in period t depends only on worker’s
productivity in that period. From (16)-(19) the real income of a worker employed in sector
















where μ = 1/(1 − ρ) is a ﬁxed mark-up above real marginal costs. The ﬁrst term is labor
income and the second term is proﬁt equally distributed among households. From the cash-
in-advance constraint (15), equilibrium consumption in the absence of transfers – the outside
















when inﬂation in period t is πj and the worker was assigned to sector f in period t − 1.
Combining the goods’ market clearing condition with the government budget constraint
(21) and the cash-in-advance constraint (15), government expenditures are






It follows from (24) and (25) that the equilibrium consumption in the absence of transfers
and the government expenditures is independent of the precision of the inﬂation target signal.
With risk-sharing transfers, from Deﬁnition 2 and Equation (24), period-t equilibriumNegative social value of information
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when period-t signal of period-t + 1 inﬂation is sk, period-t inﬂation is πj, and the worker
of the household was assigned to production sector j in period t − 1. With pure insurance
transfers the equilibrium period-t consumption depends only on period-t direct purchases xi
t,
total resources available for private consumption Xt, and the signal st on the period t + 1
inﬂation target realized in period t. In particular, this implies that the current transfers
prescribed by the arrangement do not hinge on the individual transfers received in the past.
This allows us to write the optimal risk-sharing arrangement problem in a recursive form.
For two inﬂation states and two signals on next period inﬂation rate the optimal contract






subject to participation constraints for high and low signals
u(c







































, Vrs ≡ E [Vrs(πj)],







, Vout ≡ E [Vout(πj)].
As the ﬁrst point in characterizing socially optimal arrangements, we show that the
optimal arrangement exists and is unique.
Lemma 1 The socially optimal arrangement exists and is unique. The arrangement and
the social welfare are continuous functions in the precision of the public signal.
The proof provided in the technical appendix employs the Theorem of the Maximum,
and relies on the convexity of the set of allocations that satisfy participation constraints.
Next, we highlight some valuable characteristics of the optimal risk-sharing arrangement.
Among the participation constraints (27) and (28) only restrictions for high productivity
agents can potentially be binding for the optimal arrangement. Households assigned to low
productivity ﬁrms are never worse oﬀ under the optimal arrangement relative to their outside
option because the arrangement prescribes transfers from high productivity households as
stated in the following lemma.
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The proof is provided in the technical appendix. First, we show that under the optimal
arrangement in any state high income households consume at least as much as the low income
households. Otherwise, if there are states such that low income households obtain more than
the high income households, then an arrangement that prescribes perfect risk sharing in those
states is sustainable and welfare improving. Second, we show that high income agents obtain
not more than the outside option. By contradiction, either the participation constraint of
some low productivity households is violated or a deviation can be constructed that yields
higher social welfare.
As an immediate corollary from Lemma 2, the socially optimal arrangement satisﬁes
Vrs(πj) − Vout(πj) ≥ 0 for all inﬂation states πj. In other words, in any inﬂation state the
value of the optimal arrangement cannot be lower than the value of the allocation in the
equilibrium without transfers.
5.2 Information, patience, and folk theorems
Before we proceed to our main result, we ﬁrst pin down the cases when information precision
does not aﬀect social welfare, and then show that perfect risk sharing is less likely to be sus-
tainable when the precision of public announcements increases. The following lemmas help
to exclude these possibilities by characterizing the sustainability of the optimal commitment
allocation and conditions when the outside option is the only sustainable allocation.
One potential candidate for the optimal risk-sharing arrangement is the optimal com-
mitment allocation. Since all households are ax-ante the same, the optimal commitment
allocation is perfect risk sharing ci
t = (xh
t + xl
t)/2 for all households. Though voluntary
participation imposes additional restrictions on the socially optimal arrangement, this does
not mean that the optimal commitment allocation is never attainable. Indeed, perfect risk
sharing may still be the socially optimal arrangement if the discount factor β is high enough.
This result, commonly known as the folk theorem is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 There exists a value ¯ β such that for any discount factor β ≥ ¯ β the socially optimal
arrangement for any signal precision is perfect risk sharing.
Proof. Perfect risk sharing provides the highest ex-ante utility among the consumption-
feasible allocations. The existence of ¯ β follows from monotonicity of participation constraints
in β and ¯ Vrs > Vout, where ¯ Vrs is the value of the perfect risk-sharing arrangement. In the
participation constraints (27) and (28) a higher β increases the future value of perfect risk
sharing relative to the allocation in the equilibrium without transfers, leaving the current
incentives to deviate unaﬀected. Therefore, if the participation constraints are not binding
for ¯ β, they are not binding for any β ≥ ¯ β.
On the lower end of sustainable arrangements, if the level of patience is relatively low, the
set of sustainable allocations may shrink to one point, which is the equilibrium allocation in
the absence of transfers. If the equilibrium with no transfers is the only sustainable allocation
for a certain level of patience then the socially optimal allocation is again the outside option
if households are even less patient.
Lemma 4 If for a certain discount factor β the equilibrium allocation in the absence of
transfers is the socially optimal arrangement for any signal precision, then for any β ≤ β
the socially optimal arrangement is the equilibrium allocation in the absence of transfers.
Proof. Assume that for some β ≤ β there exists an optimal arrangement diﬀerent from
the equilibrium allocation with no transfers. The arrangement allocation is sustainable. By
Lemma 2, the value of this arrangement is at least as high as the value of defecting into
the outside option for any inﬂation state. Then for β the allocation is also sustainable since
the value of the arrangement other than the outside option gets an even higher weight in
the participation constraints. This contradicts that for β the optimal arrangement is the
no-transfer equilibrium allocation.
In order to characterize the amount of consumption that high productivity households
are willing to share with low productivity households it is useful to distinguish two oppositeNegative social value of information
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The proof is provided in the technical appendix. First, we show that under the optimal
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eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is due to the increase in disposable resources available for consump-
tion and therefore we refer to it as the wealth eﬀect. Under low inﬂation, the disposable
resources are higher, which tends to scale up the value of the arrangement, the value of the
outside option, and the gain of the arrangement relative to the allocation of the no-transfer
equilibrium. The second eﬀect is related to the beneﬁts of insurance, and we name the ef-
fect the risk aversion eﬀect. Under high inﬂation consumers’ disposable resources are lower,
but this may lead to even higher beneﬁts of risk sharing relative to the outside option if
households’ risk aversion is high enough.
In general, the wealth and the risk aversion eﬀects lead households to value insurance
diﬀerently in diﬀerent inﬂation states. However, there is the degenerate possibility that
these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other. This is the case when the relative gain of the
optimal arrangement Vrs(πj) − Vout(πj) is the same for all inﬂation states πj.7 Throughout
the following analysis we exclude this possibility. Instead, either the wealth eﬀect dominates
when Vrs(πl) − Vout(πl) > Vrs(πh) − Vout(πh), or the risk aversion eﬀect dominates when the
inequality is reversed.
We can now analyze how informative policy announcements inﬂuence the outcome of
the optimal insurance arrangement under voluntary participation. Signal precision plays an
important role for the sustainability of perfect risk sharing. In the following proposition we
show that the level of patience that is needed to sustain perfect risk sharing increases in the
precision of the signal.
Proposition 1 Let ¯ β(κ) be the cutoﬀ point such that for each β ≥ ¯ β(κ) perfect risk shar-
ing is the socially optimal arrangement. The cutoﬀ point ¯ β(κ) is strictly increasing in the
precision of the public signal.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.1. The cutoﬀ point is determined by a participation
constraint for high productivity households that imposes the tightest restriction. Which
7The relative gain of the insurance arrangement for homogenous preferences vanishes when the degree
of homogeneity converges to zero. The risk aversion eﬀect (the wealth eﬀect) dominates for a degree of
homogeneity smaller (larger) than zero.
particular constraint is the tightest depends on the gains the perfect risk-sharing arrangement
oﬀers relative to the equilibrium in the absence of transfers as can be seen from (27) and (28).
The gain can be higher either under low or under high inﬂation. This depends on whether
the wealth or risk aversion eﬀect is dominant. However, in both cases the tightest constraint
imposes a stronger restriction under informative signals than under uninformative signals.
Suppose without loss of generality that the risk aversion eﬀect dominates, i.e. the perfect
risk sharing arrangement provides higher value relative to the equilibrium allocation without
transfers under high inﬂation than under low inﬂation. While for high productivity agents
the current period loss of staying in the arrangement is independent of signal precision,
under the low next period inﬂation signal the expected future gain of insurance is lower for
informative signals than for uninformative signals. Therefore, the level of patience needed
to sustain the perfect risk sharing allocation is higher under an informative signal.
5.3 Information and welfare under partial risk sharing
A number of studies indicate that the more realistic case is when risk sharing is neither
perfect nor absent, but partial.8 This case is analyzed below. We show that the transfers
prescribed by the arrangement depend on signal precision, and the signal can shape the
resulting consumption allocation signiﬁcantly. As our main result, we provide conditions
for social welfare to be decreasing in the precision of the public signal. We exclude the
cases when the optimal arrangement is either perfect risk sharing or the outside option and
signal precision does not directly aﬀect the arrangement and social welfare. Lemmas 5 and
6 provide suﬃcient conditions for a socially optimal arrangement that is neither perfect risk
sharing nor the outside option.
If perfect risk sharing is not sustainable, a number of participation constraints of high
productivity agents are binding. Which constraints are binding depends on the current loss
relative to the outside option and the future value of the arrangement. We focus on the case
8See e.g. Townsend (1994) or more recently Ligon et al. (2002).Negative social value of information
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equilibrium. The second eﬀect is related to the beneﬁts of insurance, and we name the ef-
fect the risk aversion eﬀect. Under high inﬂation consumers’ disposable resources are lower,
but this may lead to even higher beneﬁts of risk sharing relative to the outside option if
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diﬀerently in diﬀerent inﬂation states. However, there is the degenerate possibility that
these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other. This is the case when the relative gain of the
optimal arrangement Vrs(πj) − Vout(πj) is the same for all inﬂation states πj.7 Throughout
the following analysis we exclude this possibility. Instead, either the wealth eﬀect dominates
when Vrs(πl) − Vout(πl) > Vrs(πh) − Vout(πh), or the risk aversion eﬀect dominates when the
inequality is reversed.
We can now analyze how informative policy announcements inﬂuence the outcome of
the optimal insurance arrangement under voluntary participation. Signal precision plays an
important role for the sustainability of perfect risk sharing. In the following proposition we
show that the level of patience that is needed to sustain perfect risk sharing increases in the
precision of the signal.
Proposition 1 Let ¯ β(κ) be the cutoﬀ point such that for each β ≥ ¯ β(κ) perfect risk shar-
ing is the socially optimal arrangement. The cutoﬀ point ¯ β(κ) is strictly increasing in the
precision of the public signal.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.1. The cutoﬀ point is determined by a participation
constraint for high productivity households that imposes the tightest restriction. Which
7The relative gain of the insurance arrangement for homogenous preferences vanishes when the degree
of homogeneity converges to zero. The risk aversion eﬀect (the wealth eﬀect) dominates for a degree of
homogeneity smaller (larger) than zero.
particular constraint is the tightest depends on the gains the perfect risk-sharing arrangement
oﬀers relative to the equilibrium in the absence of transfers as can be seen from (27) and (28).
The gain can be higher either under low or under high inﬂation. This depends on whether
the wealth or risk aversion eﬀect is dominant. However, in both cases the tightest constraint
imposes a stronger restriction under informative signals than under uninformative signals.
Suppose without loss of generality that the risk aversion eﬀect dominates, i.e. the perfect
risk sharing arrangement provides higher value relative to the equilibrium allocation without
transfers under high inﬂation than under low inﬂation. While for high productivity agents
the current period loss of staying in the arrangement is independent of signal precision,
under the low next period inﬂation signal the expected future gain of insurance is lower for
informative signals than for uninformative signals. Therefore, the level of patience needed
to sustain the perfect risk sharing allocation is higher under an informative signal.
5.3 Information and welfare under partial risk sharing
A number of studies indicate that the more realistic case is when risk sharing is neither
perfect nor absent, but partial.8 This case is analyzed below. We show that the transfers
prescribed by the arrangement depend on signal precision, and the signal can shape the
resulting consumption allocation signiﬁcantly. As our main result, we provide conditions
for social welfare to be decreasing in the precision of the public signal. We exclude the
cases when the optimal arrangement is either perfect risk sharing or the outside option and
signal precision does not directly aﬀect the arrangement and social welfare. Lemmas 5 and
6 provide suﬃcient conditions for a socially optimal arrangement that is neither perfect risk
sharing nor the outside option.
If perfect risk sharing is not sustainable, a number of participation constraints of high
productivity agents are binding. Which constraints are binding depends on the current loss
relative to the outside option and the future value of the arrangement. We focus on the case
8See e.g. Townsend (1994) or more recently Ligon et al. (2002).Negative social value of information
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when all constraints are binding and state below suﬃcient conditions for this case to apply.
Lemma 5 If all participation constraints for high productivity agents are violated under an
arrangement that prescribes perfect risk sharing in all states then all the constraints are
binding under the optimal arrangement.
The proof of this lemma is provided in the technical appendix. First, under the conditions
of the lemma, we show that for all states the optimal arrangement satisﬁes strict inequalities
cl(πj,sk) < ch(πj,sk). Second, by contradiction we show that a Lagrangian multiplier on
any participation constraint of a high productivity agent cannot be zero, since otherwise the
inequalities do not hold.
Binding participation constraints imply that perfect risk sharing is not optimal, however
on the other hand, the optimal arrangement may be given by another extreme, which is
the outside option. In the following lemma we provide conditions under which there exists
a socially optimal arrangement diﬀerent from the consumption allocation in the absence of
transfers. In particular, we consider a situation when the signal is uninformative.
Lemma 6 Consider the case of an uninformative public signal with all participation con-














then the socially optimal arrangement is not the consumption allocation of the equilibrium
in the absence of transfers.
The proof is provided in the technical appendix. Under binding participation, the optimal
arrangement should necessary solve a ﬁxed point problem in terms of the value of the risk-
sharing arrangement. The outside option is always a solution to the ﬁxed point problem.
The condition stated in the lemma guarantees that for an uninformative signal there exists
another solution to the ﬁxed point problem, which is a sustainable arrangement and is strictly
preferable to the outside option.
From the perspective of an agent with a high current period income, risk sharing in future
periods is attractive if the agent values the future signiﬁcantly enough and if the agent is
subject to high enough consumption risk in the equilibrium without transfers. Both aspects
are reﬂected in condition (30) of Lemma 6. Taking it to one extreme, if future consumption is
worthless for agents (i.e. β = 0), then the outside option is the only sustainable arrangement.
Therefore, the threshold for β implied by condition (30) is strictly positive. On the other
hand, if the consumption risk in the equilibrium without transfers is signiﬁcant, the marginal
utility for consuming the low income relative to the high income, u�(xl(πj))/u�(xh(πj)), may
become substantial, and thus the required level of patience for engaging in social insurance
is low.
In the following theorem we establish our main result that social welfare is strictly de-
creasing in the precision of the public signal.
Theorem 2 If all participation constraints for high productivity agents are binding and the
equilibrium allocation in the absence of transfers is not the only sustainable arrangement,
then social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision of the public signal on future inﬂation.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.2. For any two values of signal precision κ1 < κ2, we
construct a consumption allocation for κ1 based on the optimal allocation for κ2 as follows.
The allocation is constructed to satisfy participation constraints for κ1 with equality while
the value of the arrangement in future periods corresponds to the optimal arrangement for
κ2. We show that this allocation delivers strictly higher welfare than the optimal allocation
for κ2, and is also sustainable for signal precision κ1. Thus, since the optimal allocation for
κ1 must be at least as good as the one constructed, welfare is strictly higher for lower signal
precision.
The negative inﬂuence of informative signals on social welfare can be illustrated as fol-
lows. Assume that the risk aversion dominates the wealth eﬀect. Suppose further the realizedNegative social value of information
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then the socially optimal arrangement is not the consumption allocation of the equilibrium
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sharing arrangement. The outside option is always a solution to the ﬁxed point problem.
The condition stated in the lemma guarantees that for an uninformative signal there exists
another solution to the ﬁxed point problem, which is a sustainable arrangement and is strictly
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hand, if the consumption risk in the equilibrium without transfers is signiﬁcant, the marginal
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become substantial, and thus the required level of patience for engaging in social insurance
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equilibrium allocation in the absence of transfers is not the only sustainable arrangement,
then social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision of the public signal on future inﬂation.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.2. For any two values of signal precision κ1 < κ2, we
construct a consumption allocation for κ1 based on the optimal allocation for κ2 as follows.
The allocation is constructed to satisfy participation constraints for κ1 with equality while
the value of the arrangement in future periods corresponds to the optimal arrangement for
κ2. We show that this allocation delivers strictly higher welfare than the optimal allocation
for κ2, and is also sustainable for signal precision κ1. Thus, since the optimal allocation for
κ1 must be at least as good as the one constructed, welfare is strictly higher for lower signal
precision.
The negative inﬂuence of informative signals on social welfare can be illustrated as fol-
lows. Assume that the risk aversion dominates the wealth eﬀect. Suppose further the realizedNegative social value of information
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signal indicates that the next period inﬂation is more likely to be low. From the signal house-
holds infer that the future value of the arrangement relative to the outside option is lower,
which is an unfavorable outcome for all households. Therefore the high productivity agents
require higher current period consumption. In contrast, under the high inﬂation signal,
which indicates a higher value of the arrangement relative to the outside option, the high
productivity agents can be satisﬁed with lower current period consumption. Compared to
uninformative signals, the consumption allocation prescribed by the optimal arrangement di-
verges as precision increases, i.e. the consumption allocation of high income agents becomes
riskier ex-ante. Binding participation constraints imply that the expected utility of high
income agents before the signal realization is independent of signal precision. Since house-
holds are risk averse, high income agents are less willing to share their good fortune with
low income agents when information gets more precise. Correspondingly, from the resource
constraint it follows that low income households are better oﬀ under imperfect information.
Therefore, ex-ante risk averse agents prefer uninformative policy announcements.
The negative value of information does not depend on whether the wealth eﬀect or the
risk aversion eﬀect is dominant. If the wealth eﬀect dominates, the high productivity agents
require lower current period consumption following a low inﬂation signal, and demand higher
current period consumption following a high signal. Nonetheless, from an ex-ante perspective
such divergences are still welfare decreasing for risk averse agents.
We prove that social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision when all participation
constraints for high productivity agents are binding. This is a suﬃcient condition. Our
numerical computations reveal that as long as perfect risk sharing is not sustainable for
uninformative signals, social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision no matter how many
constraints are binding at the optimal arrangement. Evidently, if perfect risk sharing is
sustainable under uninformative signals but not under informative signals – which can occur
since the minimum level of patience needed to sustain perfect risk sharing is increasing in
precision (see Proposition 1) – less information is still preferable.
The strongest eﬀect of information on welfare is observed – measured as the diﬀerence
in social welfare between uninformative and perfectly informative signals – when all partic-
ipation constraints for high productivity agents are binding. The eﬀect is weaker when in
some inﬂation states the optimal allocation exhibits perfect risk sharing, which is the case
when participation constraints are not binding in those states. Intuitively, in such a case the
inﬂuence of information on risk sharing is limited to states with binding constraints, and the
overall eﬀect on the consumption allocation is smaller.
The result in Theorem 2 is robust with respect to the value of the outside option. The
assumption of agents living forever in the equilibrium without transfers when a given risk-
sharing arrangement is declined constitutes a harsh penalty. The main result stays valid
qualitatively if this assumption is relaxed. Suppose the penalty were weaker, for example, if
agents were allowed to reengage in social insurance. Then under the optimal arrangement
the high income agents would be less willing to share the risk with the low income agents. In
this case, since the marginal utility of low income households is higher, public information
plays an even more signiﬁcant role than under harsher punishment.
In this section we have characterized how the precision of public signals on future inﬂa-
tion aﬀects optimal insurance under voluntary participation when prices are ﬂexible. If the
optimal arrangement is partial risk sharing, the precision of the signal eﬀectively inﬂuences
the distribution of consumption in the risk-sharing arrangement. We show that higher pre-
cision in signals is socially undesirable because this decreases the willingness of high income
households to transfer resources to less fortunate households. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
level of patience needed to sustain the perfect risk sharing allocation is strictly increasing in
the precision of the signal. The reason for this is that the public information provided by
the monetary authority does not help agents to make better decisions for the future. In the
next section we extend our framework to allow for a beneﬁcial role of public information,
and thereby assess the importance of the detrimental eﬀect of policy announcements on risk
sharing.Negative social value of information
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current period consumption following a high signal. Nonetheless, from an ex-ante perspective
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We prove that social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision when all participation
constraints for high productivity agents are binding. This is a suﬃcient condition. Our
numerical computations reveal that as long as perfect risk sharing is not sustainable for
uninformative signals, social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision no matter how many
constraints are binding at the optimal arrangement. Evidently, if perfect risk sharing is
sustainable under uninformative signals but not under informative signals – which can occur
since the minimum level of patience needed to sustain perfect risk sharing is increasing in
precision (see Proposition 1) – less information is still preferable.
The strongest eﬀect of information on welfare is observed – measured as the diﬀerence
in social welfare between uninformative and perfectly informative signals – when all partic-
ipation constraints for high productivity agents are binding. The eﬀect is weaker when in
some inﬂation states the optimal allocation exhibits perfect risk sharing, which is the case
when participation constraints are not binding in those states. Intuitively, in such a case the
inﬂuence of information on risk sharing is limited to states with binding constraints, and the
overall eﬀect on the consumption allocation is smaller.
The result in Theorem 2 is robust with respect to the value of the outside option. The
assumption of agents living forever in the equilibrium without transfers when a given risk-
sharing arrangement is declined constitutes a harsh penalty. The main result stays valid
qualitatively if this assumption is relaxed. Suppose the penalty were weaker, for example, if
agents were allowed to reengage in social insurance. Then under the optimal arrangement
the high income agents would be less willing to share the risk with the low income agents. In
this case, since the marginal utility of low income households is higher, public information
plays an even more signiﬁcant role than under harsher punishment.
In this section we have characterized how the precision of public signals on future inﬂa-
tion aﬀects optimal insurance under voluntary participation when prices are ﬂexible. If the
optimal arrangement is partial risk sharing, the precision of the signal eﬀectively inﬂuences
the distribution of consumption in the risk-sharing arrangement. We show that higher pre-
cision in signals is socially undesirable because this decreases the willingness of high income
households to transfer resources to less fortunate households. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
level of patience needed to sustain the perfect risk sharing allocation is strictly increasing in
the precision of the signal. The reason for this is that the public information provided by
the monetary authority does not help agents to make better decisions for the future. In the
next section we extend our framework to allow for a beneﬁcial role of public information,
and thereby assess the importance of the detrimental eﬀect of policy announcements on risk
sharing.Assessment of risk-sharing distortions
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6 Assessment of risk-sharing distortions
The main purpose of this section is to evaluate the risk-sharing eﬀect. To serve this goal,
we introduce a positive eﬀect of information by considering imperfectly ﬂexible prices. We
assume that a positive fraction of intermediate good producers preset their prices one period
in advance (Woodford, 2003), which results in increasing aggregate resources with better
public information. We proceed to quantitatively assess the importance of the negative and
positive eﬀects of information by setting up a numerical example that shares some salient
features with the U.S. economy. We ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of information prevails for
reasonable degrees of risk aversion. Furthermore, the increase in the U.S. income inequality
over the last decades tends to amplify the negative role of public information about aggregate
risk on social welfare. As robustness checks, we subsequently allow for a weaker penalty
for default, for self-insurance, and staggered-price setting (Calvo, 1983). As an alternative
possibility to measure the negative eﬀect of information and independent of a particular
positive eﬀect of information, we then compare the gain of uninformative signals relative to
the elimination of all inﬂation ﬂuctuations (Lucas, 2003).
6.1 Imperfectly ﬂexible prices
When some monopolistically competitive ﬁrms have to preset prices, ﬁrms’ problems become
non-trivial. Solving ﬁrst the cost minimization problem of the perfectly competitive ﬁnal























Using the production technology (17), the ﬁnal good ﬁrm demand (31), and integrating over





















t ≥ 1 by Jensen’s inequality. The
highest level of production is achieved when all diﬀerentiated goods ﬁrms are ﬂexible in their
pricing decision and, therefore, set the same price p
fj
t = pt.
Signal precision under imperfectly ﬂexible prices aﬀects the outcome of the optimal insur-
ance arrangement in two diﬀerent ways. First, it inﬂuences the willingness of high produc-
tivity households to share with low productivity households, as highlighted in the previous
section. Second, it aﬀects the amount of resources that can be shared among the households.
The inﬂuence of the latter eﬀect can be illustrated by a particular participation constraint.
With a fraction of prices preset and for price dispersion, which is symmetric in predicted
and realized inﬂation,9 the constraint in the recursive formulation for a high inﬂation signal



















where Δf and Δ
f
−1 are the current and the previous period price dispersions, πj is the
current period inﬂation, and Vrs and Vout are the value of the arrangement and the value
of the outside option deﬁned accordingly. An increase in precision distorts risk-sharing
opportunities when risk sharing is partial, but on the other hand it allows sticky price ﬁrms
to set their prices more accurately, thereby resulting in less price distortions and a better
9Symmetry implies that price dispersion for any signal realization depends on the precision of the signal
but not on the signal itself.Assessment of risk-sharing distortions
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positive eﬀects of information by setting up a numerical example that shares some salient
features with the U.S. economy. We ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of information prevails for
reasonable degrees of risk aversion. Furthermore, the increase in the U.S. income inequality
over the last decades tends to amplify the negative role of public information about aggregate
risk on social welfare. As robustness checks, we subsequently allow for a weaker penalty
for default, for self-insurance, and staggered-price setting (Calvo, 1983). As an alternative
possibility to measure the negative eﬀect of information and independent of a particular
positive eﬀect of information, we then compare the gain of uninformative signals relative to
the elimination of all inﬂation ﬂuctuations (Lucas, 2003).
6.1 Imperfectly ﬂexible prices
When some monopolistically competitive ﬁrms have to preset prices, ﬁrms’ problems become
non-trivial. Solving ﬁrst the cost minimization problem of the perfectly competitive ﬁnal
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highest level of production is achieved when all diﬀerentiated goods ﬁrms are ﬂexible in their
pricing decision and, therefore, set the same price p
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Signal precision under imperfectly ﬂexible prices aﬀects the outcome of the optimal insur-
ance arrangement in two diﬀerent ways. First, it inﬂuences the willingness of high produc-
tivity households to share with low productivity households, as highlighted in the previous
section. Second, it aﬀects the amount of resources that can be shared among the households.
The inﬂuence of the latter eﬀect can be illustrated by a particular participation constraint.
With a fraction of prices preset and for price dispersion, which is symmetric in predicted
and realized inﬂation,9 the constraint in the recursive formulation for a high inﬂation signal



















where Δf and Δ
f
−1 are the current and the previous period price dispersions, πj is the
current period inﬂation, and Vrs and Vout are the value of the arrangement and the value
of the outside option deﬁned accordingly. An increase in precision distorts risk-sharing
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to set their prices more accurately, thereby resulting in less price distortions and a better
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allocation of resources. Taking it to the extreme, if the socially optimal arrangement is
either the outside option or perfect risk sharing, then the expected utility of households is
increasing in signal precision.
We compute social welfare in two steps. First, for any given precision we calculate
prices and production by solving the problems of ﬁnal good ﬁrms (18), and monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms (19) and (20). Second, taking the resources available for consumption
as given, we derive the value of the outside option and compute the optimal consumption
allocation according to (26)-(29).
6.2 Quantitative assessment: imperfectly ﬂexible prices
We set up a numerical example to assess quantitatively the eﬀect of public announcements.
The baseline is constructed to match stylized facts for the U.S. economy on an annual basis.
We calibrate the inﬂation process to the postwar U.S. consumer price index that results in two
states with 1.2 and 5.7 percent inﬂation rates. We set the variance of the productivity process
to 0.1, which is the average of the variance for the transitory component of within-groups
income for the U.S. between 1980 and 2003 as estimated by Krueger and Perri (2006).10
Throughout the example we employ standard preferences that feature constant relative risk
aversion, and calibrate the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods to a value
of 6 following Woodford (2003). The fraction of sticky price ﬁrms is set to 13 percent, which
is the value found by Bils and Klenow (2004) using U.S. data for 1995-1997 collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. We keep the discount factor at the highest value such that all
participation constraints are violated under perfect risk sharing (the condition of Lemma 5)
for any precision.
We measure the social value of policy announcements as the percentage diﬀerence in
certainty equivalent consumption between uninformative and perfectly informative signals.
In other words, this measure captures the percentage amount of annual consumption agents
10Violante (2002) provides similar numbers for wage inequality.
are willing to give up until they are indiﬀerent between perfectly informative announcements
and no announcements at all.
We ﬁnd that the optimal announcements are either no announcement (κ = 1/2) or perfect
announcements (κ = 1). The negative eﬀect of information dominates for any coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion that exceeds 4.66, which is not an unreasonably high value of the
coeﬃcient.11 The result is illustrated in Figure 3 where the social value of information is
shown as a function of risk aversion for three diﬀerent fractions of preset prices, 1 − λ,
including 13%, which is our baseline value. When a larger fraction of prices is adjusted more
frequently the social value of information becomes negative for even lower degrees of risk
aversion (see the dotted line for 1 − λ = 0.05 in Figure 3).
It is a well-documented fact the U.S. have experienced a substantial increase in income
inequality over the last decades (see Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 2002, Krueger and Perri, 2006).
We capture this evidence by an increase in the variance of the income process σ2
y which results
from the random assignment of workers to sectors of diﬀerent productivity. How does this
increase in income inequality aﬀect the trade-oﬀ between the destruction of insurance pos-
sibilities on one hand and the better allocation of resources on the other hand, when policy
announcements become more precise? For this exercise we set the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion to 4.66 – implying that the positive and negative eﬀect of more precise information
cancel out for the average of the idiosyncratic variance in the U.S. between 1980 and 2003.
Employing our baseline calibration we obtain that for the variance of the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of within-group income observed in 1980, the social value of information was positive.
From 1980 to 2003 the variance increased from 8 percent to 12 percent (Krueger and Perri,
2006). This renders the social value of information negative. This result is illustrated in
Figure 4. For the income inequality observed in 2003, a secretive inﬂation target is desirable
unless the fraction of prices preset for one year were exceeding 16 percent.
11There is quite a controversy about the magnitude of the constant risk aversion coeﬃcient (see Campbell,
2003, Kocherlakota, 1996b, Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Kocherlakota (1996b) summarized the prevailing
view “... that a vast majority of economists believe that values for [the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion]
above ten (or, for that matter above ﬁve) imply highly implausible behavior on part of the individuals.”Assessment of risk-sharing distortions
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allocation of resources. Taking it to the extreme, if the socially optimal arrangement is
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shown as a function of risk aversion for three diﬀerent fractions of preset prices, 1 − λ,
including 13%, which is our baseline value. When a larger fraction of prices is adjusted more
frequently the social value of information becomes negative for even lower degrees of risk
aversion (see the dotted line for 1 − λ = 0.05 in Figure 3).
It is a well-documented fact the U.S. have experienced a substantial increase in income
inequality over the last decades (see Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 2002, Krueger and Perri, 2006).
We capture this evidence by an increase in the variance of the income process σ2
y which results
from the random assignment of workers to sectors of diﬀerent productivity. How does this
increase in income inequality aﬀect the trade-oﬀ between the destruction of insurance pos-
sibilities on one hand and the better allocation of resources on the other hand, when policy
announcements become more precise? For this exercise we set the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion to 4.66 – implying that the positive and negative eﬀect of more precise information
cancel out for the average of the idiosyncratic variance in the U.S. between 1980 and 2003.
Employing our baseline calibration we obtain that for the variance of the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of within-group income observed in 1980, the social value of information was positive.
From 1980 to 2003 the variance increased from 8 percent to 12 percent (Krueger and Perri,
2006). This renders the social value of information negative. This result is illustrated in
Figure 4. For the income inequality observed in 2003, a secretive inﬂation target is desirable
unless the fraction of prices preset for one year were exceeding 16 percent.
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Figure 3: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative signals
expressed in percentage certainty equivalent consumption as a function of risk aversion.
We proceed further by conducting three robustness checks: lower the penalty for default,
allowing for self-insurance, and Calvo pricing.
Weaker penalty for default
The negative eﬀect of information on social welfare is ampliﬁed when the penalty for default
is decreased, i.e. the value of the outside option is higher. To illustrate this property, we
compute the social value of information when households are allowed to reengage in social
insurance after one period instead of living in the equilibrium without transfers forever. The
Figure 4: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative signals
expressed in percentage certainty equivalent consumption as a function of the fraction of
prices preset.











f,πh) + β(1 − κ)Vout(Δ
f,πl).
Though qualitatively similar to our standard case in which agents are not allowed to reengage
in risk sharing arrangements, the results diﬀer quantitatively. Under a lower penalty for
default, the negative aspect of information dominates the positive one for even lower degrees
of risk aversion and even when idiosyncratic income uncertainty is lower (see Figures 5 and
6 in the technical appendix). For example, when the fraction of preset prices equals theAssessment of risk-sharing distortions
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value found by Bils and Klenow (2004), the negative eﬀect of information outperforms the
positive eﬀect for degrees of risk aversion higher than 3.5. Moreover, even for an idiosyncratic
income variance from 1980, the social value of policy announcements becomes negative in
this scenario.
Self-insurance
Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we allow for the possibility of self-insurance
captured by the cash-in-advance constraints written as inequalities, i.e. ptxi
t ≤ Mi
t−1 instead
of (15). This permits agents to save money for purchases in future periods. In our numerical
example, agents nevertheless optimally choose not to save in the optimal arrangement. Self-
insurance and voluntary transfers both facilitate consumption insurance, but self-insurance
is associated with the burden of inﬂation costs, and therefore agents ﬁnd it inferior.
The cash-in-advance constraints written with inequalities do however inﬂuence the op-
timal arrangement through the outside option. When deciding about participation in a
risk-sharing arrangement, agents take into account that self-insurance increases the value of
their outside option.12 This implies that the high productivity agents have smaller incen-
tives to share with the low productivity agents, and consequently, the optimal arrangement
is worse from an ex-ante perspective. For our baseline calibration with ﬂexible prices and
coeﬃcients of risk aversion from 1 to 4.66, the utility loss can add up to 3% measured in con-
sumption equivalents. This implies a larger degree of consumption dispersion between high
and low productivity agents, and the marginal gain of redistribution that can be achieved
by uninformative signals is now higher than in the absence of self-insurance. As a result, the
negative eﬀect of information on social welfare is stronger, e.g. for a relative degree of risk
aversion of 4, the welfare gain of uninformative signals in consumption equivalents is 0.024%
with self-insurance as compared to 0.011% in the absence of it.
Staggered-price setting
12The value of the outside option is now the result of an optimization problem. To get accurate solutions
for this optimal self-insurance problem we iterate on the value function subject to the cash-in-advance
constraints formulated as inequalities.
Remarkably, the positive eﬀect of information is mitigated under staggered price setting
as in Calvo (1983), where each period ﬁrms face an invariant probability to reset their
prices. Calvo ﬁrms weight over the current and an inﬁnite number of future periods –
the next one where the signal is informative and over the following periods in which they
rely only on unconditional expectations. On the contrary, in our environment ﬁrms preset
prices for one period only and thus put all the emphasize on that period for which the
signal is informative. Correspondingly, all distortions in relative prices root in imperfect
information on the aggregate state in that period. This in turn implies that the positive
eﬀect of information on aggregate resources is in general stronger when a fraction of ﬁrms
has to preset prices one period ahead than under Calvo pricing.
6.3 Quantitative assessment: aggregate ﬂuctuations
Instead of introducing a positive eﬀect of information, the negative eﬀect of policy announce-
ments on future inﬂation targets can be evaluated relative to the well studied welfare gain
from complete removal of aggregate ﬂuctuations (Lucas, 2003). For the baseline calibra-
tion with ﬂexible prices, we calculate ﬁrst the socially optimal arrangement with constant
inﬂation equal to the average U.S. postwar consumer price inﬂation. Second, we compute
social welfare with stochastic inﬂation under perfectly informative and under uninformative
signals. A number of values for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are considered up to
50, which is the value implied by risk-premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). We ﬁnd
that the welfare gain of completely uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative
signals measured in certainty equivalent consumption is in the range of 9 to 53 percent of
the welfare gain under a constant inﬂation rate (see Table 1). Even for reasonable degrees
of relative risk aversion below ﬁve (see Kocherlakota, 1996b), the relative welfare gain of un-
informative signals on aggregate ﬂuctuations accounts for up to approximately 18 percent,
which can be referred to as sizeable.Assessment of risk-sharing distortions
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that the welfare gain of completely uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative
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Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σc 2 5 10 20 50
Welfare gain, % 9.1 17.6 35.3 44.2 53.3
Table 1: Welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative signals as
a percentage of welfare gain from inﬂation stabilization measured in certainty equivalent
consumption.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the welfare eﬀects of policy announcements about future aggregate
risk in the presence of idiosyncratic risk. We developed a stylized model of a monetary
production economy that integrates optimal insurance arrangements for idiosyncratic risk
under voluntary participation. In this environment, we analyzed how the precision of signals
on future inﬂation targets aﬀects social welfare.
The main message of the paper is that more precise announcements on future monetary
policy can be detrimental to social welfare. By revealing information on future realizations
of the aggregate risk, the policymaker distorts households’ insurance incentives and thereby
increases the riskiness of the optimal consumption allocation that is consistent with rational
participation incentives.
The eﬀect we describe is one additional channel through which public announcements
aﬀect social welfare. In the stylized model we show that the eﬀect is sizeable relative to
the commonly considered positive eﬀects of information, and to the removal of aggregate
ﬂuctuations. While we focus on monetary policy announcements, the eﬀect is relevant for
any announcements of public policy. It should be taken into consideration by policymakers.
The size of the eﬀect for each particular application is subject of assessment and further
research. This would require developing a fully-ﬂedged stochastic general equilibrium model
that comprises the insurance mechanism and is moreover able to match the salient facts of
business cycles.References
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The cutoﬀ point for β is characterized by the tightest participation constraint, which is
the one that becomes binding for any level of patience below the cutoﬀ point. Among the
participation constraints only constraints for high productivity agents can be binding, which
limits consideration to four cases.
There are two independent factors that determine the tightest participation constraint:
the relative gain of deviation from perfect risk sharing to the outside option for high income
households, and the expected future gain of perfect risk-sharing arrangement relative to the
outside option. Without loss of generality, consider a case such that
u(x
h(πl)) − u(¯ x(πl)) ≤ u(x
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(A.1) states that the current period deviation for a high income household is more attrac-
tive in the high inﬂation state. The second inequality (A.2) implies that for the perfect
risk-sharing arrangement the risk aversion eﬀect dominates, i.e. the perfect risk-sharing ar-
rangement provides higher value in comparison to the outside option under high inﬂation.
Therefore, for any precision of the signal, the participation constraint of high productivity
agents under high current inﬂation and a low future inﬂation signal is the one that imposes
the tightest restriction. This constraint holds with equality at the cutoﬀ point
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The cutoﬀ point for β is characterized by the tightest participation constraint, which is
the one that becomes binding for any level of patience below the cutoﬀ point. Among the
participation constraints only constraints for high productivity agents can be binding, which
limits consideration to four cases.
There are two independent factors that determine the tightest participation constraint:
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households, and the expected future gain of perfect risk-sharing arrangement relative to the
outside option. Without loss of generality, consider a case such that
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the tightest restriction. This constraint holds with equality at the cutoﬀ point
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where ¯ Vrs(πj) = u(¯ x(πj)) and ¯ Vrs = (u(¯ x(πh)) + u(¯ x(πl)))/2.
Solving (A.3), there exists a unique solution for ¯ β in (0,1) due to u(xh(πh))−u(¯ x(πh)) > 0.




¯ β(1 − ¯ β)(¯ Vrs(πh) − Vout(πh) − ¯ Vrs(πl) + Vout(πl))
u(xh(πh)) − u(¯ x(πh)) + dV (κ) + 2¯ β(dV (1/2) − dV (κ))
> 0,
where dV (κ) ≡ κ(¯ Vrs(πl)−Vout(πl))+(1−κ)(¯ Vrs(πh)−Vout(πh)) and satisﬁes 0 ≤ dV (κ) ≤
dV (1/2).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose Vrs(κ1) ≤ Vrs(κ2) for some κ1 < κ2. Consider an alternative consumption allocation
{˜ ci(πj,sk,κ1)} for signal precision κ1 constructed on the basis of the optimal allocation
{ci(πj,sk,κ2)} for κ2 according to
u(˜ c





(Vrs(κ2) − Vout) (A.4)
u(˜ c





(Vrs(κ2) − Vout) (A.5)
and the corresponding allocation for low productivity agents given by consumption feasibility.
Vrs(πj,κ2) and Vrs(κ2) characterize the optimal allocation for κ2.
First, the alternative allocation {˜ ci(πj,sk,κ1)} is consumption-feasible by construction.
Second, the alternative allocation {˜ ci(πj,sk,κ1)} delivers strictly higher expected util-
ity than the optimal allocation for signal precision κ2, i.e. ˜ Vrs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2), where
˜ Vrs(κ) ≡ 1
8
�
f,j,k u(˜ cf(πj,sk,κ)). We prove this result by showing that high productivity
agents are indiﬀerent between the optimal allocation and the alternative allocation, and low
productivity agents strictly prefer the alternative allocation.
For signal precision κ2 by assumption the risk aversion and wealth eﬀects do not oﬀset
each other and the outside option is not the only sustainable arrangement. Without loss
of generality, suppose that the risk aversion eﬀect dominates, i.e. Vrs(πl,κ2) − Vout(πl) <
Vrs(πh,κ2) − Vout(πh). Subtracting (A.5) from (A.4) we get
u(˜ c
h(πj,sh,κ)) − u(˜ c
h(πj,sl,κ)) = (2κ − 1)β((Vrs(πl,κ2) − Vout(πl))
− (Vrs(πh,κ2) − Vout(πh))).
Therefore, for any κ < κ2
u(c
h(πj,sh,κ2)) < u(˜ c
h(πj,sh,κ)) ≤ u(˜ c
h(πj,sl,κ)) < u(c
h(πj,sl,κ2)). (A.6)
For high productivity agents, the alternative allocation for κ1 and the optimal allocation
for κ2 deliver the same expected utility in any state πj, as can be seen from adding (A.4)
and (A.5).









is strictly decreasing in precision over κ ≤ κ2. This result follows from (A.4)-(A.6), con-
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where ¯ Vrs(πj) = u(¯ x(πj)) and ¯ Vrs = (u(¯ x(πh)) + u(¯ x(πl)))/2.
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f,j,k u(˜ cf(πj,sk,κ)). We prove this result by showing that high productivity
agents are indiﬀerent between the optimal allocation and the alternative allocation, and low
productivity agents strictly prefer the alternative allocation.
For signal precision κ2 by assumption the risk aversion and wealth eﬀects do not oﬀset
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of generality, suppose that the risk aversion eﬀect dominates, i.e. Vrs(πl,κ2) − Vout(πl) <
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Therefore, for any κ < κ2
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h(πj,sl,κ)) < u(c
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For high productivity agents, the alternative allocation for κ1 and the optimal allocation
for κ2 deliver the same expected utility in any state πj, as can be seen from adding (A.4)
and (A.5).
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and ∂W l(πj,1/2)/∂κ = 0. In particular, this implies that ˜ Vrs(πj,κ1) > Vrs(πj,κ2), and
therefore ˜ Vrs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2).
Third, the alternative allocation {˜ ci(πj,sk,κ1)} satisﬁes the participation constraints for
signal precision κ1. This results follows immediately from construction of the alternative
allocation, and from the ﬁnding in the previous step that the alternative allocation for
κ1 < κ2 provides strictly higher utility in all inﬂation states than the optimal allocation for
κ2.
Finally, the social value of the optimal allocation for κ1 is at least as large as for any other
feasible allocation compatible with participation constraints Vrs(κ1) ≥ ˜ Vrs(κ1). Therefore,
˜ Vrs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2) is a contradiction to Vrs(κ1) ≤ Vrs(κ2).
B Technical appendix
B.1 Additional details for the proof of Theorem 1
First, we consider the perfect information environment. The Lagrangian of the optimal















































































where μ1, μ2, and λ denote the Lagrangian multipliers, ¯ y ≡ (yh+yl)/2, and with consumption
under type-b policy already substituted in.
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and ∂W l(πj,1/2)/∂κ = 0. In particular, this implies that ˜ Vrs(πj,κ1) > Vrs(πj,κ2), and
therefore ˜ Vrs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2).
Third, the alternative allocation {˜ ci(πj,sk,κ1)} satisﬁes the participation constraints for
signal precision κ1. This results follows immediately from construction of the alternative
allocation, and from the ﬁnding in the previous step that the alternative allocation for
κ1 < κ2 provides strictly higher utility in all inﬂation states than the optimal allocation for
κ2.
Finally, the social value of the optimal allocation for κ1 is at least as large as for any other
feasible allocation compatible with participation constraints Vrs(κ1) ≥ ˜ Vrs(κ1). Therefore,
˜ Vrs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2) is a contradiction to Vrs(κ1) ≤ Vrs(κ2).
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The ﬁrst order conditions can be analyzed in two steps. First, the optimal consumption
in the second period is independent of the second period endowment realization. From (B.2)
and (B.3) we immediately obtain chh
2g = chl
2g ≡ ch




2g. Thus, the second period resource constraint can be rewritten exactly as for
the ﬁrst period: (ch
2g + cl
2g)/2 = (yh + yl)/2. Second, agents prefer to smooth consumption
between the ﬁrst and the second period. Substituting the Lagrange multipliers from (B.4)
and (B.5) into (B.1) and (B.2) and combining with the resource constraints we get










From the two steps we conclude that the socially optimal consumption of the high endowment








except for type-b policy when all goods are taxed away.






































































































































Comparing (B.7) and (B.8) reveals that u(ch
1g) < u(ch
1) < u(yh), and taking into account
ch




B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let S(κ) be the set of sustainable allocations. The outside option is always in the set of
sustainable allocations, and the restrictions imposed by the participation constraints (27),
(28) and consumption feasibility (29) deﬁne a bounded and closed set. Therefore, for any
precision of the public signal, S(κ) is nonempty and compact-valued. Furthermore, it can
be shown that the correspondence ϕ : [1/2;1] → R8
+, which maps κ �→ S(κ) is continuous.Technical appendix




















The ﬁrst order conditions can be analyzed in two steps. First, the optimal consumption
in the second period is independent of the second period endowment realization. From (B.2)
and (B.3) we immediately obtain chh
2g = chl
2g ≡ ch




2g. Thus, the second period resource constraint can be rewritten exactly as for
the ﬁrst period: (ch
2g + cl
2g)/2 = (yh + yl)/2. Second, agents prefer to smooth consumption
between the ﬁrst and the second period. Substituting the Lagrange multipliers from (B.4)
and (B.5) into (B.1) and (B.2) and combining with the resource constraints we get










From the two steps we conclude that the socially optimal consumption of the high endowment








except for type-b policy when all goods are taxed away.






































































































































Comparing (B.7) and (B.8) reveals that u(ch
1g) < u(ch
1) < u(yh), and taking into account
ch




B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let S(κ) be the set of sustainable allocations. The outside option is always in the set of
sustainable allocations, and the restrictions imposed by the participation constraints (27),
(28) and consumption feasibility (29) deﬁne a bounded and closed set. Therefore, for any
precision of the public signal, S(κ) is nonempty and compact-valued. Furthermore, it can
be shown that the correspondence ϕ : [1/2;1] → R8
+, which maps κ �→ S(κ) is continuous.Technical appendix
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 58
B
Given that the objective function (26) is also continuous, by the Theorem of the Maximum
(Berg´ e, 1963) there exists a solution to the optimal arrangement problem for any public
signal precision, and the expected utility of the socially optimal arrangement is continuous
in signal precision.
In addition, the set of sustainable allocations is convex-valued due to the concavity of the
utility function, and the objective function is strictly concave. By the Maximum Theorem
under Convexity the optimal arrangement is unique and continuous in signal precision.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let {ci(πj,sk)} be the optimal arrangement. First, we show that for any state (πj,sk) in
the optimal arrangement the high income agents obtain at least as much as the low income
agents, i.e. ch(πj,sk) ≥ cl(πj,sk). By contradiction, assume there exist inﬂation πj and
signal sj such ch(πj,sk) < cl(πj,sk). Let the perfect risk sharing allocation be deﬁned as
¯ x(πj) ≡ (xh(πj) + xl(πj))/2, and consider an arrangement {˜ ci(πj,sk)} given by
˜ c
h(πj,sk) = ˜ c
l(πj,sk) = ¯ x(πj), ˜ c
i( ˜ H) = c
i( ˜ H),
with ˜ H as the set of all possible states, excluding (πj,sk). By construction the arrangement
provides strictly higher utility for risk-averse households than {ci(πj,sk)}. We are left to
prove that the arrangement {˜ ci(πj,sk)} is sustainable. High income households undoubt-
edly accept the arrangement because it delivers both higher current period consumption
and higher future arrangement utility. Low income households in state (πj,sk) obtain the
same utility as the high income households. Given that the outside option is worse for low
income households and the high income households accept the arrangement, the low income
households must also accept the arrangement. Summing up, the arrangement {˜ ci(πj,sk)} is
sustainable and socially preferable over {ci(πj,sk)}. This contradicts that {ci(πj,sk)} is the
socially optimal arrangement.
Second, we show that for any state ch(πj,sk) ≤ xh(πj,sk). Again, by contradiction,
assume that there is a state such that ch(πj,sk) > xh(πj,sk). If the participation constraint
for the high productivity agent under πj inﬂation and sk signal holds with equality then
the future value of the arrangement is lower than the outside option value, and taking
into account that for the low productivity agent from the resource constraint cl(πj,sk) <
xl(πj,sk) the participation constraint for the low productivity agent is violated. Therefore,
the considered participation constraint for the high productivity agent can only hold with a
strict inequality. Then, consider a consumption allocation {˜ ˜ ci(πj,sk)} given by
˜ ˜ c
h(πj,sk) = c
h(πj,sk) − ε, ˜ ˜ c
l(πj,sk) = c
l(πj,sk) + ε, ˜ ˜ c
i( ˜ H) = c
i( ˜ H).
By continuity there exists ε > 0 such that the consumption allocation {˜ ˜ ci(πj,sk)} is sustain-
able, and by concavity the constructed allocation provides higher utility then the allocation
{ci(πj,sk)}, which contradicts that {ci(πj,sk)} is the socially optimal arrangement.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5
First, we show that if participation constraints are violated under perfect risk sharing for
any state then the optimal consumption allocation satisﬁes
c
h(πj,sk) > ¯ x(πj) > c
l(πj,sk), (B.9)
where ¯ x(πj) again is the perfect risk sharing allocation in inﬂation state πj. Without loss of
generality, consider the participation constraint for households of high productivity in the
previous period under currently high inﬂation that receive a high signal on future inﬂation.
The constraint holds for the socially optimal arrangement
u(c
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Given that the objective function (26) is also continuous, by the Theorem of the Maximum
(Berg´ e, 1963) there exists a solution to the optimal arrangement problem for any public
signal precision, and the expected utility of the socially optimal arrangement is continuous
in signal precision.
In addition, the set of sustainable allocations is convex-valued due to the concavity of the
utility function, and the objective function is strictly concave. By the Maximum Theorem
under Convexity the optimal arrangement is unique and continuous in signal precision.
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edly accept the arrangement because it delivers both higher current period consumption
and higher future arrangement utility. Low income households in state (πj,sk) obtain the
same utility as the high income households. Given that the outside option is worse for low
income households and the high income households accept the arrangement, the low income
households must also accept the arrangement. Summing up, the arrangement {˜ ci(πj,sk)} is
sustainable and socially preferable over {ci(πj,sk)}. This contradicts that {ci(πj,sk)} is the
socially optimal arrangement.
Second, we show that for any state ch(πj,sk) ≤ xh(πj,sk). Again, by contradiction,
assume that there is a state such that ch(πj,sk) > xh(πj,sk). If the participation constraint
for the high productivity agent under πj inﬂation and sk signal holds with equality then
the future value of the arrangement is lower than the outside option value, and taking
into account that for the low productivity agent from the resource constraint cl(πj,sk) <
xl(πj,sk) the participation constraint for the low productivity agent is violated. Therefore,
the considered participation constraint for the high productivity agent can only hold with a
strict inequality. Then, consider a consumption allocation {˜ ˜ ci(πj,sk)} given by
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i( ˜ H) = c
i( ˜ H).
By continuity there exists ε > 0 such that the consumption allocation {˜ ˜ ci(πj,sk)} is sustain-
able, and by concavity the constructed allocation provides higher utility then the allocation
{ci(πj,sk)}, which contradicts that {ci(πj,sk)} is the socially optimal arrangement.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5
First, we show that if participation constraints are violated under perfect risk sharing for
any state then the optimal consumption allocation satisﬁes
c
h(πj,sk) > ¯ x(πj) > c
l(πj,sk), (B.9)
where ¯ x(πj) again is the perfect risk sharing allocation in inﬂation state πj. Without loss of
generality, consider the participation constraint for households of high productivity in the
previous period under currently high inﬂation that receive a high signal on future inﬂation.
The constraint holds for the socially optimal arrangement
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but is violated by assumption under perfect risk sharing









where ¯ Vrs ≡ u(¯ x(πh))+u(¯ x(πl))/2 denotes the value of the perfect risk-sharing arrangement.
The right hand side of (B.10) or (B.11) represents the total value of the outside option.
Combining (B.10) and (B.11) we get
u(c








Taking into account that the optimal contract delivers a value no larger than the value of
perfect risk sharing Vrs(πj) ≤ u(¯ x(πj)), and Vrs ≤ ¯ Vrs, from (B.12) we get
u(c
h(πh,sh)) > u(¯ x(πh))
or, combining with resource feasibility
c
h(πh,sh) > ¯ x(πh) > c
l(πh,sh).
Similarly we can show that the same inequalities hold for the other public states.
Second, by contradiction, assume that there is one participation constraint for high pro-
ductivity agents that is not binding. The Lagrangian of the optimal contract problem (26)-
(29) can be written as









l(πj,sk) − 2¯ x(πj)) + ξ( ˜ H), (B.13)
where (πj,sk) is the state for which the participation constraint is not binding, ˜ H is the set of
all possible states, excluding (πj,sk), λi(πj,sk) are the normalized Lagrange multipliers for
the participation constraints, μ(πj,sk) are the Lagrange multipliers for resource constraints,
and ξ( ˜ H) collects consumption and resources for states in ˜ H, and respective multipliers. The
Lagrange multiplier for the participation constraint for state (πj,sk) is zero and is explicitly
excluded from the Lagrangian.
Solving the optimal arrangement problem (B.13) we get
c
h(πj,sk) = c
l(πj,sk) = ¯ x(πj)
for the state (πj,sk), which contradicts the partial risk-sharing condition (B.9) stated above.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 6
The socially optimal risk sharing arrangement under uninformative signals can be analyzed
as a ﬁxed point problem in terms of the period value of the arrangement. When signals
are uninformative, the optimal arrangement is conditional only on current inﬂation, and the
number of binding participation constraints of high productivity households reduces to two.
The ﬁxed point problem is constructed as follows. Let w be the future one-period value
of an arrangement. We restrict attention to w ∈ [Vout, ¯ w), since per assumption all partici-
pation constraints for high productivity agents are binding. The two binding participationTechnical appendix
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but is violated by assumption under perfect risk sharing
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The optimal arrangement should necessary solve the ﬁxed point problem w = V (w).
We show that V (w) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, therefore there exist at
most two solutions to the ﬁxed problem. From the participation constraints (B.14) and








































By construction, one solution to the ﬁxed point problem is Vout. The concavity of V (w)
implies that the derivative of V (w) at Vout is higher than at any partial risk-sharing allocation.













in order for the optimal arrangement to be diﬀerent from the outside option.
From the other end, suppose there exists a socially optimal arrangement diﬀerent from
the allocation in the absence of transfers and participation constraints are binding. Then
the value of this arrangement must be a solution to the ﬁxed point problem. This requires
that the slope of V (w) at Vout must be necessarily larger than unity, due to the concavity of
V (w) and because the allocation in the absence of transfers must always be one solution of
the constructed ﬁxed point problem.
B.6 Figures in case of reengagement in social insuranceTechnical appendix
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implies that the derivative of V (w) at Vout is higher than at any partial risk-sharing allocation.













in order for the optimal arrangement to be diﬀerent from the outside option.
From the other end, suppose there exists a socially optimal arrangement diﬀerent from
the allocation in the absence of transfers and participation constraints are binding. Then
the value of this arrangement must be a solution to the ﬁxed point problem. This requires
that the slope of V (w) at Vout must be necessarily larger than unity, due to the concavity of
V (w) and because the allocation in the absence of transfers must always be one solution of
the constructed ﬁxed point problem.
B.6 Figures in case of reengagement in social insurance
Figure 5: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative signals
as a function risk aversion when households are allowed to reengage in social insurance after
one period.Technical appendix
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Figure 6: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative signals
as a function the fraction of prices preset when households are allowed to reengage in social
insurance after one period.